Dimensions of the Darfur crisis and its consequences: An Arab perspective

12 - May - 2013


The crisis facing Darfur since 2003 is representative of a complex and multilayered situation whose internal and external dimensions are too intertwined to respond to the tools of standard analysis. Western discourse – and in particular American discourse – promotes a collection of myths and claims that fail the test of reality. It encourages theories such as ethnic cleansing, forced migration and racial divisions between Arabs
and Africans, which is a form of propaganda warfare in all its forms and shapes.1 That ideological turn, loaded with the intellectual and mythical bias which entered the world after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, unjustifi ably pushed the world community to adopt particular stances and policies that have impeded the process of serious negotiations about Darfur.

However, while disagreeing with these myth-based accusations I by no means underestimate the seriousness of the human dimensions of the crisis or the repeated violations of human rights in the region. On the contrary, challenging the assumption called for by some effective outside forces represents a suitable and necessary opportunity to present a realistic and unbiased depiction of actual events in Darfur.

The Darfur region, whose size exceeds that of France, has a great history and civilisation. It holds the largest number of Quranic teaching centres in Sudan, in addition to maintaining a learning compartment (rwaq) at Al-Azhar University.

Before the discovery of oil, Darfurians sent an annual caravan of gifts and supplies to the Holy Kaaba to meet some of the pilgrims’ needs. It is reported, for example, that after the British army had executed the last emperor of Darfur, Ali Dinar, in 1916, his grandchildren moved to Mecca to live off the Darfur endowment there.2

Despite all of this, the way Arabs and Muslims deal with the Darfur crisis is characterised by a lack of involvement and carelessness.3 For example, the Arab League failed to take fi rm action towards ending the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and it is clear that this
tardy reaction of the Arabs was based on miscalculation and lack of initiative. After studying the events in the region, the Arabs used to take refuge in interpretations based on conspiracy theories.

Given Darfur’s wealth, it is no wonder that everyone seeks a share, from ambitious Western countries hoping to gain wealth and infl uence to rising Asian powers, particularly China. The one thing Arabs have in common is a refusal to become involved in this exhausting world race without the guarantee of a tangible share of its riches. The events in Darfur send out a warning signal that the Arab region is experiencing a major strategic vacuum and unless Arabs rush to fi ll it, problems will not be confi ned to Darfur.

The aim of this study is to critically explore the Darfur confl ict and the future of the region and Sudan from an Arab perspective. The factors that will be explored are based on local, regional and international dimensions.

Local dimensions:

The Darfur crisis – and the factors that led to it – is deeply rooted in the environment and competition over scarce resources. The confl ict over land and resources stems from the Darfurians’ need for water and pasture. The scarcity of resources resulted in increased tribal friction, which led to intertribal confl ict and war. The confl ict resulted in clashes among settled (mostly African) tribes and nomadic (mostly Arab) tribes. This has shaped the Darfurian confl ict into a confrontation between nomadic and settled peoples.4

The Fur is one of the largest settled tribes and the largest ethnic group, and the region was named ‘Darfur’ after it. Other tribes of African origin include the Zaghawa, Massaleit, Fellata, Dajo and Berti. The pastoralist tribes include the Bani Hussein, Habania, Zeiydiya, Bani Helaba, Ateefat, Mahameed, Bani Jarrar, Rizeiqat and Taaisha.5

According to Sudanese anthropologists, all these tribes claim a connection to the Arabs and speak the Arabic language. Many tribes which are considered to be non-Arab, such as the Fur, Zaghawa and Mediob, speak Arabic fl uently, in addition to their local languages.6 The tribal framework for understanding the confl ict in Darfur provides a simplistic interpretation. One has to question the veracity of tribal and ethnic confl ict in Africa in general and in Sudan in particular.

The question is why violence is used instead of negotiating and bargaining to settle these confl icts. In his comment on the events in Rwanda of 1994, which resulted in the death of more than half a million people in a period of only three months, Gérard Prunier stated that ‘we need to understand the true reasons behind these mass massacres. Perhaps the easier and more credible interpretation is to place the blame on the tribal variable and avoid the details and other variables which may supersede the importance of the tribal variable.’7 This analysis could also be applied to the nature of the dominant interrelations between various tribes in Darfur, which has always been a model of ethnic and cultural integration.

However, the issue of Darfur, from a local perspective, refl ects the crisis of national state-building and introduces problems of identity, citizenship and the distribution role of the Sudanese state. Khalil Ibrahim, leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), refers to political control in Khartoum, which has been dominated since independence by the northern elite at the expense of other marginalised regions in Sudan, in The black book: imbalance of power and wealth in the Sudan.8 In Ibrahim’s opinion, the root of all rebel movements in the Darfur region may be linked to the quest for wealth and power.

While recognising the importance of development and economic perspectives in the Darfur crisis, some observers point out that a sharp division among the ruling governing elite – and in particular the two wings of the Sudanese Islamic movement – is at the core of the crisis. The ruling political powers, whether military or civilian, aim at politicising the demands of the inhabitants of Darfur, which adds to the complexity of the matter.

It is also noteworthy that since the arrival in 1989 of the military government led by Omar al-Bashir, the qualifi cation for occupying a public position became loyalty rather than effi ciency, and this explains the existence of a large number of secret cadres from the Revolutionary Command Council in most government positions. However, after the split between al-Bashir and Turabi those who voiced their opposition, such as Khalil Ibrahim (who occupied several regional ministerial positions in addition to being the political representative of the Islamic Front in Darfur),9 were removed.

One of the most obvious characteristics of the Darfur issue is the political division among armed rebel groups and organisations in the region.10 Consequently there is an absence of true leadership and a clear vision which would have helped to achieve a signifi cant political breakthrough to end the rebellion. This is comparable to the situation in the time of the late John Garang and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) during
which as many as 25 armed groups were active in Darfur. Some of these groups had a presence on the Internet and thus became known as ‘Internet groups’.11 This may have created even more complications in resolving the issue of Darfur.12

Khalil Ibrahim, who has headed the JEM since its founding in 2003, proclaims the necessity of establishing a true federation within the framework of a unifi ed Sudan and advocates a rotation of state presidents. The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), headed by Abdul Wahid Mohammed al-Nur, on the other hand is greatly infl uenced by the framework of the SLM in the south and the concept of a ‘New Sudan’. It demands an end to marginalisation by the application of a new formula for the division of power and the distribution of wealth and by adopting secularism and equality as a basis for citizenship. These two major rebel movements have undergone numerous splits and divisions.13

In January 2007 a group under the leadership of Idris Azraq rebelled against Khalil Ibrahim’s leadership and accused him of favouring his own Zaghawa tribe. However, the most serious division in the JEM occurred because of the establishment in 2004 of the National Movement for Reform and Development headed by Djibril Abdul Kareem Jibril AbdlKareem (aka Bari), who had worked in the presidential guard of Chadian President Idriss Déby and is also a member of the Zaghawa tribe. A similar tribal division occurred in the SLM. In November 2005 a confl ict over power took place between Mini Arkou Minawi, from the Zaghawa tribe and the leader of the military movement, and Abdel Wahed Mohamed el-Nur, from the Fur tribe and leader of the movement. Minawi’s wing negotiated with the government and signed the Darfur Peace Accord in 2006, after which Minawi accepted a senior government position. However, a large number of Minawi fi ghters were opposed to the Darfur Peace Accord and joined other rebel groups.

Evidence shows that most of the rebel factions have engaged in acts of theft, armed robbery and murder in Darfur. These actions have impeded humanitarian relief work and have forced the Sudanese government and its loyal militias to respond with violence of all kinds. All active parties in Darfur seek the best terms for themselves in the bargaining process, whether they achieve them militarily or politically. Consequently, the Darfur Peace Accord is stillborn, because it has contributed to the fragmentation of the opposition. It is also rejected by most Darfurians because it only addresses some of the issues.

Regional dimensions:

Because of the tribal overlapping between Darfur and Chad, the Chadian confl ict also had an infl uence on the social structure in Darfur.14 In fact, three presidents of Chad, and most recently Idriss Déby, entered the palace of N’Djamena through a Darfur-based insurgency.

Alsayed Abdullah Abtar, the fi rst commander of the Darfur Liberation Front – which sparked the fi rst rebellion in 2003 – was one of the leaders of a successful attack launched in Darfur in 1990 and also led Idriss Déby to take power in Chad. Likewise, the confl ict in Southern Sudan, which is frequently regarded as a liberation struggle under the leadership of the late John Garang, has infl uenced the inhabitants of Darfur. The SLM enter the region from the Central African Republic (CAR) in order to put more pressure on the government in Khartoum. The regional element adds a new dimension to the confl ict in Darfur, because it contributes to the ease with which weapons can be obtained, inhabitants can learn how to use them, and fi ghters can be trained.

In view of the political instability in the countries neighbouring Sudan – especially those adjacent to Darfur – western Sudan is used as a base in proxy wars. Armed Chadian militias maintain, support and deploy troops in Darfur and the Darfur rebel forces maintain close relations with the Chadian government, which provides them with shelter and arms. President Déby, who belongs to the Zaghawa tribe, is in a state of open
warfare with the regime of President Omar al-Bashir in Sudan.15 In late January 2008, the ruling regime in N’Djamena was the subject of a devastating attack by rebel Chadian forces which besieged President Déby in his palace. Although this military operation failed because of military and logistical reasons and because France sided with President Déby, it soured Chadian/Sudanese relations. Sudan for example accused the Chadian government of being behind the failed assault attempt against Omdurman in May 2008, which had been launched by JEM forces headed by Khalil Ibrahim.

The unstable situation in the CAR has in turn contributed to the armed confl ict that has spread across the region into Chad and Sudan. After the CAR attained independence from France in 1960, the country suffered consecutive coups culminating in the advent of Jean-Bedel Bokassa in 1965, who ruled as emperor until he was deposed by French troops in 1979. Instability and a weak centralised power structure were the most obvious features of Bokassa’s regime and contributed to the ease of movement of weapons and rebels across the CAR to and from neighbouring regions.

It is noteworthy that Libya plays a pivotal role in attempts to settle the confl ict in Darfur and that it has hosted the peace process. Libya has also appealed, more than once, to adversaries not to turn the crisis in Darfur into an international political confl ict.

Nigeria, too, embraced the Darfur peace negotiations in 2006 and has provided Eritrea with material and logistical support in support of its unceasing attempts to consolidate all opposing parties to this accord. Egypt is interested in Sudanese affairs in general, but its role does not go beyond supporting the Sudanese position and demanding a peaceful settlement of the crisis. The Egyptian position perhaps refl ects the offi cial Arab stance, which the Arab League has expressed in general terms.

In general there is no doubt that the confl ict in Darfur has altered and reconfi gured regional interactions between neighbouring Arab and African countries, with every regional party attempting to infl uence the events of this confl ict to further its own interests. A strong indicator is the African Union’s attempts, from the onset of the confl ict in Darfur, to see it as an ‘African problem’ requiring an ‘African solution’.16

The AU dispatched peacekeeping forces to the region in 2004 – these were transformed in late December 2007 into a hybrid UN and AU force (in terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007).

International dimensions:

There is an exciting international discourse concerning the intellectual and ideological inclinations and biases towards the confl ict in Darfur, its settlement venues and management. Many civil society organisations and human rights associations and activists in North America and among Western nations in general regard the crisis as an expression of organised ethnic cleansing on the part of the Sudanese government against
its African citizens. Consequently, phrases such as ‘worst human crisis’, ‘worst crime against humanity in the 21st century’ and ‘human tragedy’17 characterise international discourse on Darfur. Alex de Waal – one of the most visible writers in defence of the necessity for international intervention in Darfur by civil society, human rights associations and so forth in the West, and in the US in particular – lacks a clear vision and stretches the truth when describing events in Darfur. The West views Darfur as a confl ict between Arabs and Africans, or as an organised campaign of ethnic cleansing. (Arguably, they forget, or deliberately ignore, what happened during massacres and mass killings in Rwanda in 1994.)

This helps to de-emphasise that the crisis in Darfur has another inhumane impact, one which refl ects the truth of imperialistic greed and
international rivalry in the region after the end of the Cold War era. Further, in some respects the confl ict is a continuation of the clash between Islam and the West and evolving Western awareness of issues in the Middle East/Muslim world after the events of 11 September 2001.

A number of incidents and events emphasise this point. An organisation called ‘Save Darfur Coalition’ in the US is a non-governmental organisation concerned with pressuring the American government to intervene in the Darfur crisis. It is noteworthy that more than 80 per cent of the founders belong to Zionist and Christian organisations connected with Israel, which raises doubts about the true intentions behind its goals and activities. It is possible that the image it is attempting to plant in the minds of Americans – especially religious communities and African Americans – is one of Arab enslavement of and discrimination against Africans in Sudan. There is no doubt that such claims are fi nding a receptive audience in the US. The Save Darfur Coalition customarily fills Congress members’ mailboxes with letters and demands to hold demonstrations before Congress. In its calls for sympathy with Darfur it also airs commercials at broadcasting stations and repeatedly publishes pictures on TV channels of Sudanese people dying of hunger, often with a caption asking, ‘How will history judge us?’.

The Israeli government acts in order to display the humanitarian aspect of its foreign policy or in an attempt to embellish its image in the world public opinion. The SLMAbdlwahed Nour wing has created a liaison offi ce in Israel which granted political asylum rights to some 500 Darfurian refugees and helped them to settle in occupied Palestine. Despite the controversy that erupted within Israeli circles on the wisdom of
such a measure, the Israeli government seems to have a secret hand in pulling the strings of the regional Arab system.18

French organisations attempted to kidnap some 100 children from their sheltered camp in Chad with the intention of handing them over to French and Belgian families in exchange for large sums of money, but a Chadian investigation revealed that the children, whose ages ranged between one and nine years, were neither orphans nor ill. This action begs the question whether it was connected to missionary and ‘Christianising’ operations in the midst of a Muslim community.

It would seem that some human rights and civil society organisations that are active in Darfur are attempting to negate historical facts and ignore the true components of the Darfur confl ict. In fact, the confl ict refl ects the reality of non-humanitarian international intervention and reveals another facet of a Western organisation that is trying to mislead us into thinking that it is acting to save Darfur.19

The position of the United States:

In September 2004 the then US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, testifi ed before the US Congress on the confl ict in Darfur.20 He confi rmed that investigations proved that Sudanese troops and their affi liated Janjaweed militia had committed atrocities against non-Arab tribes in the region, including murder and robbery. Powell added that the US State Department had concluded that this constituted ethnic cleansing in Darfur
for which the Sudanese government and its allies among Arab tribes in Darfur were responsible.21

Powell’s testimony refl ected an inclination to criticise the Sudanese government and hold it solely accountable for events in Darfur. In January 2005 the US administration came out in support of the fi ndings of an international commission of enquiry and concluded by accusing Sudan’s judicial system of defi ciency, non-transparency, and an inability to deal with crimes committed in Darfur. The US subsequently referred the fi le on the Darfur issue to the International Criminal Court (ICC).22

So, what are the underlying motives behind the US position regarding Darfur? Some of the most prominent are the following:

■ As a response to internal pressure. There are clear indications hat the Evangelical Church in the US has an impact on the process of decision-making with regard to Sudan. It supported the US Congress resolution relating to Sudan peace legislation and against the Sudanese government throughout peace negotiations in the South, which culminated in a unilateral Comprehensive Peace Accord in 2005 under US auspices. American civil rights organisations, headed by the Save Darfur Coalition, describe the confl ict as a tribal racial confl ict (in other words, Arab versus African)

■ An attempt to pull out of its involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq by focusing on the humanitarian aspect of intervention in Darfur. In this case, it is in the interest of Muslims, since the two parties in confl ict are Muslim. This means that the US’s strict stance on the issue of Darfur is an attempt to improve its image in the Muslim world by displaying a humanitarian face

■ Power struggles between the US and other international powers, China in particular, particularly because there are indications that the region west of Sudan is rich in oil and other natural resources. This means that the American administration is attempting to pave the way for unilaterally exploiting Sudan’s wealth in the west and diluting the traditional French infl uence in the region, in addition to containing growing the Chinese infl uence in the region

The position of China:

Any informed reading of the Chinese position on Darfur must take into consideration the new Chinese worldview and its vision of global politics in which it tries to reformulate and restructure the current world order based on new foundations. There are important and strategic considerations governing China’s relations not only with Sudan and Africa, but also with world superpowers. Two important matters are relevant in this context.
The first is China’s attempt to confront increasing Western pressures, especially since research centres and many Western civil society and uman rights organisations display annoyance with the growing role of China in Sudan and Africa. They argue that China’s interests are governed by considerations of dominance and profi t rather than democracy
and human rights.23

The second matter that explains the Chinese position is linked to the importance of Sudan, and Africa as a whole, to a strategic partnership with China. Sudan is a promising oil country that is exporting more than 60 per cent of its oil production to China. China has profi ted from the vacuum left by the departure of Western companies from Sudan in the early nineties after the United States has declared Sudan a ‘rogue state’ and accused it of harbouring Islamist terrorists.

It is politically and strategically important for countries such as Sudan, Zimbabwe and Angola to improve their relations with China in order to provide an alternative to the excessive Western conditions that are imposed on them. It is no secret that China has intensifi ed its political, diplomatic and economic interactions with Africa during the current decade. According to some observers the year 2006 – when Beijing held a China- Africa summit attended by 43 heads of state – represented a landmark in Chinese– African relations.

The position of the United Nations:

Action in the UN is characterised by Western infl uence, headed by the US. This makes humanitarian intentions a goal in itself rather than a means of reaching a peaceful resolution in Darfur. This leads to three fundamental issues.

First, the visions and goals of rebel groups were distorted and they were encouraged to raise the ceiling of their political demands by exaggerating their actual strength and by calling for the involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as in the case of Bosnia. Specifi cally, Abdul Wahid Mohammed al-Nur had asked for a NATO ‘bridging force’ for Darfur before signing a peace accord with the Sudanese government.

Second, international organisations and human rights groups placed the US and other nations on the list for the deployment of international peacekeeping forces in coordination with other organisations monitoring peacekeeping missions in the region. The first of these missions is the UN Mission in Sudan, which observes implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accord reached in 2005 between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army /Movement (SPLA /M). The second is the UN Mission in Darfur, which replaced AU troops in December 2007 after a series of negotiations between the UN and Sudan and which led to a resolution (Resolution 1769) on the deployment of hybrid forces. If implemented, this resolution will result in the deployment of 26 100 peacekeeping troops in Darfur, which would be the world’s largest peacekeeping force.

Third, the UN approved a mission to monitor and control unstable refugees from Darfur and people displaced by internal fi ghting along the eastern borders of Chad and to the northeast of the CAR. These troops are civilian in that they belong to the UN, but there is also a military aspect to the mission, as it is an EU protection force that is affi liated to the European Union.

The position of the International Criminal Court:

Referring the Darfur confl ict to the ICC following Security Council Resolution 1593 in 2005 represents a signifi cant development in the succession of events related to Darfur, especially after the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Sudan’s President Omar Hassan al-Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.

A number of observations need to be made for a thorough understanding of this event.

The first is that it embodies the appearance of new mechanisms which allow the dominant global powers to tamper with the sovereignty and independence of nations, especially in developing areas. The ICC, which came into being in 2002, has the jurisdiction to try in a court of law any defendant accused of committing war crimes, genocide or ethnic cleansing, regardless of such a defendant’s position or status.24

This means that no country or person is immune to prosecution, for the ICC supersedes national establishments and legal procedures. However, only three countries in the Arab world have ratifi ed this agreement, namely Jordan, Djibouti and the Comoros.

Second, the jurisdiction of the court begins when any case is referred to it by the UN Security Council. Here politics is mixed with legal issues, and this begs the question why Darfur, but not Palestine, Iraq, or even Kashmir, has come to the attention of the court. Why al-Bashir, but not George W Bush or Ehud Olmert? The court further depends on the practical support of the UN member states and the Security Council. There is no doubt that this measure affects the sovereignty of nations and undermines their stability.

Third, the ICC lacks investigative bodies in areas of confl ict. The result is an uneven application of justice. In the case of Darfur, the Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo, was able to gather little direct evidence and depended on information gleaned from the Internet and from civil and local rights organisations. Whether they are in the West or inside Sudan, these organisations are known to be ideologically biased in favour
of one or another of the parties in the Darfur confl ict. Consequently, Ocampo’s decision is not balanced and did not take into consideration the reality of Darfur’s complexities or the overlapping regional and international dimensions. (For a full understanding of Ocampo’s decision one needs to understand the reasoning behind it and realise the consequences of threatening Sudan or the Arab world as a whole. However, the decision to indict al-Bashir should not be personalised, neither should Ocampo be regarded as an agent of the West or an enemy of the Arabs.)
Any neutral observer may say that the timing of the ICC decision did not further the interests of peace and security in Sudan but rather – and far from being a conspiracy theory – forms part of a connected chain of attempts to dismantle Sudan and attack its sovereignty. If the local political elites in Sudan view the ICC decision from a narrow and selfi sh political perspective and depend on outsiders’ help, as the Iraqi experience
clearly exemplifi es, then the biggest loser would be the Sudanese nation. This situation can only be resolved if all national forces unite instead of increasing and maximizing their political demands.


The prevailing view on the nature of the confl ict in Darfur revolves around the concept of a war between ethnic African farmers and nomadic Arab tribes over access to water and pasture. In this confl ict the rebels represent the African tribes against the Arab tribes. The Arab tribes are supported by the Sudanese government and its militia, the Janjaweed. Added to this is the view is that China, which receives about two-thirds of
Sudan’s oil, does not exert any real pressure on Khartoum to stop the violation of human rights in the region.25

There is no doubt that this view is fl awed and overly simplistic and ignores the reality of this complex and interrelated crisis. The situation became even more complicated in May 2008 when a group of rebels managed to gain access to a suburb of the capital city, Khartoum, and tried to seize power by force. For the fi rst time, the battlefield was moved to Omdurman. However, the real crisis lies in the presence of more
than 2,5 million displaced persons who are living in refugee camps in neighbouring countries and about 200 000 or more who have been killed as a result of the bloody conflict.

The exit strategy for Darfur and some areas of Sudan requires judicial reform and security – particularly structural reforms to the police, army and national jurisdiction.

At the same time, it requires political and economic reforms, as well as the support and cooperation of the international community, particularly the Arab and Muslim states.26

The Darfur crisis is tied to both internal and external parties and their informed will. If foreign forces continue to work towards achieving their own political agendas, national forces should respond by promoting national over private issues and emphasising the importance of a unifi ed Sudan instead of raising ethnic and regional claims. The supreme goal for all should be unity within diversity.


  1. Julie Flint and Alexander de Waal, Darfur: a short history of a long war, London: Zed Books, 2005; John Xavier, Darfur: African genocide, New York: Rosen Publishing, 2008; Gé rard Prunier, Darfur: the ambiguous genocide, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.
  2. R S O’Fahey, The Darfur sultanate: a history, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008; Ali Osman Sayed Ahmed and al Shahid Sultan Ali Dinar, Between Saudi Arabia, Libya and Turkey: the first national resistance, documents and facts, 1898–1916, Cairo: Arab House for Publishing and Distribution, 2008.
  3. Fatema Abdul Rasul, Arab, Muslim silence on Darfur confl ict is deafening, Link org/issues/arab_muslim_silence_darfur_confl ict_deafening (accessed 2 May 2008). 
  4. Mohamed Suliman, Ethnicity from perception to cause of violent conflicts: the case of the Fur and Nuba conflicts in Western Sudan, CONTICI International Workshop, Bern, 8–11 July 1997, London: Centre for African Studies.
  5. D Hoile, Darfur in perspective, London: European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, 2005.
  6. Ibid, 8.
  7. Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, xii.
  8. A Cobham, Causes of confl ict in Sudan: testing the Black Book, European Journal of Development Research 17(3) (2005), 462–480.
  9. Hoile, Darfur in perspective, 13.
  10. Mahmood Mamdani, How can we name the Darfur crisis: preliminary thoughts on Darfur, 7 October 2004, Link (accessed 2 June 2008).
  11. The international response to Darfur, 12 May 2008, Link (accessed 13 January 2009).
  12. Ibid.
  13. Martin Plaut, Who are Sudan’s Darfur rebels? 5 May 2006, Link (accessed 5 June 2008). See also Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana, Divided they fall: the fragmentation of Darfur’s rebel groups, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2007.
  14. Roland Marchal, Chad/Darfur: How two crises merge, Review of African Political Economy 33(109)(September 2006), 467–482; Millard J Burr and Robert O Collins, The long road to disaster in Darfur,Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2006.
  15. See Ali Haggar, The origins and organization of the Janjawiid in Darfur, in Alex de Waal (ed), War in Darfur and the search for peace, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007, 113–115; and Julie Flint, Darfur’s armed movements, in De Waal, ibid, 140–172.
  16. Timothy Murithi, The African Union: Pan-Africanism, peacebuilding and development, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.
  17. N A Deans, Tragedy of humanity: the issue of intervention in the Darfur Crisis, Emory International Law Review 19(3) (2005), 1653–1696; Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen, Genocide in Darfur: investigating the atrocities in the Sudan, New York: Routledge, 2006.
  18. Mazal Mualem, Israel to grant citizenship to hundreds of Darfur refugees, Link (accessed 10 February 2009).
  19. James Ferguson, Global shadows: Africa in the neoliberal world order, Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. The author points out that many international humanitarian organisations and civil society agencies are undemocratic and fail to consider African opinion in the decisions they take.
  20. US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Written remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,         9 September 2004, Link (accessed 5 May 2008).
  21. Ibid.
  22. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 25 January 2005 (accessed 3 June 2008); Jennifer K Elsea, US policy regarding the International Criminal Court. CRS report for Congress, RL31495. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2006, Link (accessed 15 July 2008).
  23. Chin-Hao Huang, US–China Relations and Darfur, Fordham International Law Journal 31(4) (2008), 827.  
  24. Tim Allen, Trial justice: the International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army, London: Zed Books, 2006.
  25. K Campbell, Negotiating peace in Darfur, United States Institute of Peace, 2008, Link (accessed 2 February 2009).
  26. L Nathan, Long road to peace in Darfur, Pambazuka News, 8 August 2007, Link (accessed 5 June 2008).

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